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THE CONSTITUTION AND PRIVILEGE HOLDERS:
CONDITIONING THE ISSUANCE OF A LIQUOR
LICENSE UPON CONSENT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
In Daley v. Berzanskis,' the Supreme Court of Illinois recently de-
nied a liquor licensee's fourth amendment challenge to a warrantless
search2 of his tavern. Although Berzanskis had successfully prevented
the prosecution from using seized contraband in an earlier criminal pro-
ceeding,3 his suppression motion was overruled in the subsequent license
revocation hearing.4 Upholding this ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court
found that search warrants were unnecessary for liquor inspections.5 The
court reasoned that since liquor was an "evil of society" the statutes re-
quiring applicants to waive their fourth amendment rights' were a valid
precondition to receiving the liquor license.
The Berzankis situation poses three constitutional problems for an
administrative fact finder. First, is a warrantless administrative search
unreasonable? Secondly, if the search is found unreasonable, does the ex-
clusionary rule apply to administrative proceedings ?' And lastly, if the
1. 47 II. 2d 395, 269 N.E.2d 716, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
2. The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant which had previously been
quashed in a criminal proceeding. 47 Ill. 2d at 397, 269 N.E.2d at 718.
3. 47 Il1. 2d at 397, 269 N.E.2d at 718. The stolen property which was seized con-
sisted of approximately 1000 items, including cameras, radios, office equipment,
mink coats, guns, jewelry and small appliances. At the revocation hearing the stolen
items introduced into evidence were two television sets, a phonograph, and a portable
electric typewriter. Id. at 400-01, 269 N.E.2d at 720.
4. 47 II. 2d at 396, 269 N.E.2d at 717.
5. Id. at 400, 269 N.E.2d at 719.
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 112 (Supp. 1972):
Each local liquor control commissioner shall also have the following powers,
functions and duties with respect to licenses.
2. To enter or to authorize any law enforcing officer to enter at any time
upon any premises licensed hereunder to determine whether any of the provisions
of this Act or any rules or regulations adopted by him or by the State Commis-
sion have been or are being violated.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 190 (1944) :
Whenever complaint is made . . . to any judge of any court having cog-
nizance of criminal offenses, that complainant has just and reasonable grounds to
believe and does believe that alcoholic liquor is manufactured, possessed, kept for
sale, used or transported, in violation of the Act . . . the judge may issue a
search warrant as hereinafter provided; provided, however, no search warrant
shall be necessary for the inspection or search of any premises licensed under
the Act.
7. While the United States Supreme Court was dealing with a criminal trial when
it held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule applies to state
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exclusionary rule does so apply, is a fourth amendment waiver valid
when it is required as a precondition to obtaining a privilege, such as a
liquor license?
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The Supreme Court has yet to decide what circumstances are neces-
sary to render a warrantless administrative search unreasonable. In
Frank v. Maryland,' the Court held that warrantless administrative
searches were reasonable as long as a compelling state interest was pres-
ent.9 However, in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco"0 and
See v. Seattle,1 involving attempts to make warrantless building inspec-
proceedings, the language of the fourth amendment apparently precludes unreasonable
searches by administrative agencies as well as more traditional law enforcement agencies.
This has been assumed in numerous Supreme Court cases and will be taken for granted
throughout this note.
8. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank, a Baltimore city health inspector, finding evi-
dence of rat infestation in the rear of appellant's home, requested permission to inspect
appellant's basement. Appellant refused such permission and was fined for a violation
of the Baltimore City Code, which provided that
whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuis-
ance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in
the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same
and admit a full examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal
the sum of Twenty Dollars. BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950).
In a de novo proceeding, the Criminal Court of Baltimore also found appellant guilty.
The United States Supreme Court found the code provision constitutional, holding that
it touches upon only the "periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion," 359 U. S. at 367, and that it
is "hedged about with safeguards designed to make the least possible demand on the in-
dividual occupant, and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy." Id.
9. 359 U.S. at 371-7.
10. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Here the Housing Code of San Francisco provided for
warrantless inspection of any premises within the city. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL. CODE
§ 503 (1958). Appellant leased the bottom floor of an apartment building for residential
purposes. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use
of the ground floor, the city housing inspector sought unsuccessfully on three different
occasions to inspect appellant's premises without a warrant. A complaint was then filed
charging appellant with refusing to permit a lawful inspection. When appellant's de-
murrer to the criminal complaint was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohi-
bition alleging that the ordinance authorizing the inspection was unconstitutional. The
writ was denied but on appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
appellant could not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.
387 U.S. at 540.
11. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See involved Seattle's Fire Code, which authorized the
Fire Chief to inspect all buildings and premises "for the purpose of ascertaining and
causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire." CITY OF SEATTLE ORDINANCE
No. 87870, § 8.01.050 (1959). Appellant refused to allow a warrantless inspection of
his commercial warehouse, which inspection was part of a routine, periodic city-wide
check. He was convicted of refusing to permit a lawful inspection. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the fourth amendment requires a suitable warrant procedure in
order to inspect private commercial premises. 387 U.S. at 546.
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tions, the Court declared the statutes authorizing these searches unconsti-
tutional. Apparently overruling Frank, the Court stated in Camara that
the question is not whether the public interest justifies the type
of search in question, but whether the authority to search should
be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search. 2
According to the Court in Camara, governmental purposes are frustrated
by a warrant requirement in situations where evidence might be de-
stroyed, 3 or where immediate danger to life or health exists.'4 When
these situations apply, questions of public interest are only relevant in de-
ciding the existence of probable cause.'5
Camara and See may have been limited by two more recent Supreme
Court cases. 6 Closer examination, however, reveals that such an analy-
sis is unwarranted. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States dis-
12. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
13. Id. As an example, the Court cited the situation in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), where the evidence in question was the level of alcohol in defendant's
bloodstream.
14. 387 U.S. at 539. To illustrate, the Court pointed to the factual situations in-
volved in North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (un-
wholesome poultry); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox epi-
demic) ; Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health quarantine) ; Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610,
165 N.E. 498 (1929) (tubercular cattle).
15. See 387 U.S. at 538.
16. In one later decision, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring recipients of aid to dependent
children to permit frequent visits. The Court did not reach the question of reasonable-
ness, but held instead that the frequent visits required by the statute did not constitute
searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The decision was based on the
fact that the visits were designed to achieve rehabilitation, and that refusal to allow such
visits was not punishable by criminal sanctions. However, liquor license cases cannot be
decided on this basis since the purpose of liquor inspections is not to rehabilitate the li-
censee, and a refusal to permit an inspection is often a criminal offense.
17. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In Colonnade, the federal statutes in question gave au-
thority to the Secretary of the Treasury Department or his delegate to enter "during
business hours" any premise licensed for the sale of liquor. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606
(1970). A federal agent entered the premises of petitioner, who held a federal retail
liquor dealer's occupational tax stamp, without a warrant. The federal agent asked peti-
tioner to unlock his liquor storeroom, and when petitioner refused to do so, the agent
broke the lock and entered the room. He seized bottles of liquor which he suspected of
being refilled contrary to federal law. Petitioner then brought suit in federal court to
obtain return of the seized liquor, and to suppress it as evidence. The District Court
granted the relief but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, holding that the sole remedy authorized by Congress for a refusal to
permit an inspection was a forfeiture of 500 dollars. 397 U.S. at 79. In dictum, the
Court stated the statutes authorizing inspection "during business hours" were constitu-
tional. Id. at 76.
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tinguished See on its facts and indicated that warrantless inspection stat-
utes are valid in the liquor license situation. However, this part of the
opinion is only dicta,18 and involves as apparent misapplication of part
of the See decision. The Colonnade Court, interpreting See, stated that
the whole question of licensing programs is to be resolved on a case-by-
case basis. 9 However, See did not necessarily leave licensing programs to
this resolution. See held that "regulatory techniques [such] as licensing
programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or is-
suing a product" were to be decided on a case-by-case basis.20 The Court
seemed to be talking about just one search prior to marketing a product,
rather than continued administrative scrutiny throughout the course of
business. That Colonnade did not actually overrule Camara and See is evi-
denced by the fact that Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion
in Colonnade, cited Camara and See as authority for his statement in a
later case that
[t] here is not the slightest hint in See that the government could
condition a business license on the "consent" of the licensee to
the administrative searches we held violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 '
The other case which casts doubt upon Camara and See is United
States v. Biswell 2 which involved a warrantless search for firearms pur-
suant to the Gun Control Act of 1968. Here the Court emphasized the
fact that some social evils are so inherently dangerous as to render a
warrantless search reasonable. 3 Biswell, however, may be considered as
18. The Court only held that the government official involved had exceeded his
statutory authority by forcing an entry. 397 U.S. at 77.
19. In See, we reserved decision on the problems of "licensing programs" re-
quiring inspection, saying they can be resolved "on a case-by-case basis under
the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness."
397 U.S. at 76-77.
20. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
21. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Another factor
indicating that Justice Douglas felt that See and Camara were still good law after
Colonnade is his vote to grant certiorari in Berzanskis. 402 U.S. 999 (1971). If
Colonnade was dispositive of the question of the constitutionality of liquor licensing stat-
utes authorizing warrantless searches, there would have been no need to review
Berranskis.
22. - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 1593 (1972).
23. Biswell involved a warrantless search of appellee's pawn shop pursuant to the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1970). The Court noted that:
close scrutiny of . . . [firearms] traffic is undeniably of central importance in
federal efforts to prevent violent crimes. . . . Large interests are at stake,
and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.
It is also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection
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an "emergency situation" exception to the Camara rule, since possession
of certain types of firearms presents a potentially serious danger to life.
In fact, the direct connection of mail order rifles and cheap handguns
with the rapid increase in murders, robberies and assassinations was the
primary reason for passage of the Gun Control Act. 4
There is no inherent and immediate danger to health or life involved
in the sale of liquor. Characterizing liquor sales as a "social evil" should
not be sufficient grounds to validate warrantless searches absent some
additional exigent circumstances. Consequently, since Colonnade does
not appear to overrule prior cases and Biswell does not apply to the sale of
liquor, the denunciation of warrantless inspections articulated in Camara
and See can be validly applied to liquor license proceedings.
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO
ADmiNIsTRATIvE PROCEEDINGS
Since warrantless liquor inspections should not be considered reason-
able per se, the administrative fact finder must then consider whether the
exclusionary rule should apply to these situations. The United States
Supreme Court has never specifically decided this issue.2 5 The Court's
reasoning in Mapp v. Ohio,2" however, strongly supports such a view.
Using a two-pronged approach, the Mapp Court held that the unlawful
conduct of the police and the effect upon the integrity of our legal system
of using illegally seized evidence required application of an exclusionary
rule.
The first prong of the exclusionary rule is based upon the assump-
tion that the police will be discouraged from conducting improper searches
if the discovered evidence cannot be used to obtain a conviction.2 ' This
rationale should also apply to administrative investigations, since such
made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official
conduct under the Fourth Amendment.
- U.S. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 1596.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970). The legislative history of the Act stresses the
drastic increase in the use of firearms in the commission of crimes, and notes the as-
sassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Senator Robert F.
Kennedy. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-82, 183-85, 189-208, 240-59; 114
CONG. R\c. 12303-30, 12481-504, 13308-56, 13360-67, 13619-48, 14473-74 (1968) (Senate
debates) ; 114 CONG. REC. 16271-300 (1968) (House debates).
25. The Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule applicable to quasi-criminal
forfeiture proceedings, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965),
finding that the policy reasons behind Mapp support such an extension. Id. at 702.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Id. at 656-60.
28. Id. at 656.
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bodies will likewise be deterred from using illegal searches if evidence
obtained cannot produce an administrative sanction.2" The second prong
of the Mapp decision is equally applicable to administrative proceedings."
Since a state is a law breaker whenever it conducts an unlawful seizure in
violation of the fourth amendment, the Mapp Court felt that any court
which did not suppress the seized evidence would be encouraging further
disobedience and disrespect for the law. Furthermore, the court's in-
tegrity would be in question since its processes would be giving legal ef-
fect to an illegal action. While it might be argued that administrative
proceedings are not as sacrosanct as judicial proceedings, it should be noted
that the powers of administrative tribunals have become nearly equivalent
to those exercised by trial courts.3 ' Therefore, administrative proceedings
should be subject to the same standards of conduct and integrity.
Moreover, although Mapp involved a criminal prosecution, the Su-
preme Court's rationale therein has been extended to quasi-criminal for-
feiture proceedings.32 Since the ultimate penalty in such proceedings is
similar to a criminal penalty, the Court concluded, in One i958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania,"3 that
[i]t would be anomalous indeed . . . to hold that in the crimi-
nal proceeding the . . . evidence is excludable, while in the
forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the crim-
inal law has been violated, the same evidence [is admissible] ."
29. The deterrence rationale has been severely criticized as unrealistic. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) (Burger. CJ., dissenting) ; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CmI. L. RFv. 665 (1970). However, to the extent that the exclusion-
ary rule is successful in deterring improper conduct, its effectiveness should not vary
with the type of enforcement official involved.
30. The possibility of undermining the integrity of the legal system is especially
high where the agency is performing quasi-judicial functions.
31. For example, upon conviction for a violation of Illinois' liquor laws, a licensee
must forfeit the bond he had posted when he received his license. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
43, § 187 (Smith-Hurd 1944). This administratively enforced sanction is highly similar
to a criminal court's imposition of a fine for the commission of a misdemeanor.
32. Supra note 15.
33. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The automobile in question was seized pursuant to a
Pennsylvania statute which provided for forfeiture of any vehicle used in the transporta-
tion of illegal liquor. Two police officers searched the automobile without a warrant and
seized 31 cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals. At the forfeiture proceed-
ings, the owner of the automobile sought to have the liquor suppressed as evidence, al-
leging it was unlawfully seized. The trial court suppressed the evidence and dismissed
the forfeiture petition. Following successful appeals by the state in the state courts, the
United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was applicable, and re-
manded for a decision on the issue of probable cause. Id. at 702.
34. 380 U.S. at 701 (emphasis added).
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One 1958 Plymouth suggests that any administrative proceeding
which requires a showing of criminal violations is subject to the exclu-
sionary rule. This rationale has apparently been adopted by the state
courts of New York. In Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority," with
facts closely parallel to Berzanskis, the New York Supreme Court ex-
cluded illegally seized evidence from a liquor license revocation hearing,
holding that all of the policy reasons which suggest the application of the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings apply equally to administrative
hearings."
EXTENDING A PRIVILEGE
Almost every American jurisdiction has a statute similar to the Illi-
nois statutes cited in Berzanskis, requiring a liquor licensee to submit to
warrantless inspections of his business premises. Thirty-one states allow
such inspections at any time ;" eleven states allow inspections during busi-
ness hours or at reasonable times ;3" and three states authorize their liquor
control boards to make regulations concerning inspections.39 While a
few jurisdictions have indicated that such statutes are unconstitutional, 40
35. 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d
418, 227 N.E.2d 302. 280 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1967). See also Finn's Liquor Shop v. State
Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 294 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S2d 584 cert. denied, 396
U.S. 840 (1969); La Penta v. State Liquor Authority, 30 App. Div. 2d 1033, 294
N.Y.S2d 947 (1968).
36. 25 App. Div. 2d at 231-32, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
37. ARxK. STAT. ANN. § 48-1320 (1964); CAL. BUs.*& PROF. CODE § 25755 (West
Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.07 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 58-1022 (1965);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-20 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 23-930 (1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
43, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. CODE § 7-1-1-42(e) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 12-905 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-209 (1964) ; KY. REv. STAT. § 241.090 (1972);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-156 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 351 (Supp.
1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 190 (1968); MIcH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 436.7a
(1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 10265-17 (Supp. 1972) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 311-630, 311-810
(1963) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 4-113 (1968) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 53-1, 108 (1968) ;
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 178:11 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-35 (Supp. 1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-20(b) (1971 Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-12 (Supp. 1971);
OHIO RE,. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.10(A)(6), 4301A9 (Page 1965); Oia. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 539 (Supp. 1972) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 471.330 (1969) ; PA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 2-207, 2-209
(1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-12-3 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-105 (1962); TEX.
PENAL CODE art. 666-13 (1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-8-25 (1966) ; WASH. REv. CODE
§ 66.28.090 (1962) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-39 (1969).
38. ALA. CODE tit. 29, § 36(5) (1958) ALASKA STAT. § 04.15.020(f) (Supp. 1971);
IOwNA CODE ANN. § 123.33 (Supp. 1972) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.51 (1972) ; NEV. REv.
STAT. § 369.530 (1971) ; N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL LAW § 106 (McKinney 1970) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 57-218 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 4-44 (Supp. 1972) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 60-4-16 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.08 (Supp. 1972).
39. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 75-2-6 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-6
(1958) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 24 (1972) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 4-113
(1968).
40. Jolliff v. State, 215 So. 2d 234 (Miss. 1968) (dictum); Finn's Liquor Shop,
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most courts have upheld their constitutionality. 1 These courts rationalize
their decisions by holding that a liquor license is a personal privilege
4 2
and, therefore is subject to discretionary regulation and revocation.
Since 1956, when it decided Slochower v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion," the Supreme Court has never validated the waiver of a constitu-
tional right solely on the basis that the waiver was obtained as a condition
for receiving a privilege. The Court's disapproval of such waivers was
articulated in Sherbert v. Verner.4" There, appellant's religion had pre-
cluded her from accepting available employment since she could not work
on Saturday, her day of Sabbath. 5 In deciding that unemployment com-
pensation could not be withheld," the Court stated that any other decision
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her re-
ligion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on
the other hand.4"
Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969)
(dictum) ; Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970) ; but see Pride
Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 (1971).
41. See, e.g., People v. Lisner, 249 Cal. App. 2d 637, 57 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1967);
Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1953) ; State Liquor Commission v. Gilbert, 270
A.2d 876 (Me. 1970) ; Davids v. State, 208 Md. 377, 118 A.2d 636 (1955) ; Manchester
Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 89 N.H. 442, 200 A. 407 (1938); State v.
Zurawski, 89 N.J. Super. 488, 215 A.2d 564 (1965) ; Solomon v. Liquor Control Com-
mission, 4 Ohio St. 2d 31, 212 N.E.2d 595 (1965) ; Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board v. McCulley, 377 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1962) ; Brown v. State, 391 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.
Crim. 1965).
42. E.g., Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1953).
43. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Appellant was an associate professor at Brooklyn Col-
lege, which is maintained by New York City. The New York City Charter provided that
whenever a City employee utilized the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid
answering a question related to his official conduct, his employment would be terminated.
NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 903 (1938). Appellant was called to testify before the In-
ternal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate. Appellant agreed to answer all questions about his associations and political be-
liefs since 1941, but invoked the fifth amendment as to questions concerning his mem-
bership in the Communist Party during 1940 and 1941. The Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee accepted appellant's claim as a valid assertion of a constitutional right. Subse-
quently, appellant was suspended from his teaching position pursuant to the City Charter
provisions. The Supreme Court held that appellant could not be dismissed merely for
exercising a constitutional right. 350 U.S. at 558.
44. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
45. Id. at 399.
46. South Carolina allowed unemployment compensation, but a claimant was in-
eligible for such compensation if he failed, without good cause, to accept available, suit-
able work when it was offered by an employment office. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-1 to
68-401 (1962). Appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits because of her in-
ability to accept work on Saturdays. 374 U.S. at 401.
47. 374 U.S. at 404.
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Two more recent cases have reaffirmed Sherbert. Garrity v. New
York 8 specifically held that conditioning employment on a waiver of fifth
amendment rights rendered the waiver invalid since it was not "volun-
tary." 9  Similarly, Spevack v. Klein,"0 decided along with Garrity, in-
validated a fifth amendment waiver required before New York attor-
neys could enter the bar."
These cases reflect the current judicial feeling that any waiver of a
constitutional right which is used as a precondition to receiving a privi-
lege is per se invalid since it is obtained under coercive circumstances.
This logic s equally applcable to the Bercanskis liquor license situation.
CONCLUSION
Since Camara and See, a liquor license inspection ordinance has been
held unconstitutional in Utah, 2 and the Supreme Court of Mississippi has
indicated that conditioning the grant of a liquor license upon a waiver of
the fourth amendment would be unconstitutional. 8 In Finn's Liquor
48. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). In Garrity, the New Jersey law in question provided that
the public employment of anyone who refused to testify as to matters relating to such
employment upon the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him would be
terminated. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965). Appellant police officers gave
statements at an investigation which were later used as evidence in a criminal proceeding.
Appellants contended that the statements were coerced because a refusal to make them
would have resulted in a loss of public employment. 385 U.S. at 495.
49. 385 U.S. at 497-98.
50. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
51. In Spevack, appellant was disbarred after he invoked the self-incrimination
privilege in refusing to produce financial records and to testify at a judicial inquiry. The
Supreme Court held that appellant could not be disbarred for exercising a constitutional
right. 385 U.S. at 516.
52. Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (1970). In Wheeler,
defendants Boyd and Jackson refused to permit an early morning, warrantless inspection
of the Regal Lounge, which was being operated under a Salt Lake City beer license. De-
fendant Wheeler refused to allow a warrantless inspection of the same premises at 8:30
p.m. A city ordinance gave the police department authority to inspect all premises licensed
to sell beer. REv. ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY § 19-4-6 (1965). The District Court
of Salt Lake County found the ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that it permitted
"unreasonable searches and seizures." 24 Utah 2d at 113, 466 P.2d at 838. The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed, citing Camara and See with approval. Id. at 115, 466 P.2d at
840.
53. Joliff v. State, 215 So. 2d 234 (Miss. 1968). Here the defendant refused to
allow two agents of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the State Tax Commis-
sion to inspect the beer stock and beer license of Gladys' Cafe in Woodville, Mississippi.
He was convicted of attempting to impede the officers in the discharge of their lawful
duties. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did
not reserve the right to inspect premises licensed for the sale of beer. Id. at 239. In
dictum, the court stated that a government privilege cannot be granted on conditions that
require the relinquishment of a constitutional right. Id. at 236.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Shop v. State Liquor Authority,"' the Court of Appeals of New York
failed to declare New York's particular statute unconstitutional, but did
cite Camara and See for the proposition that a grant of statutory power
specifically authorizing warrantless searches would be unconstitutional. 5
Such holdings are certainly justified. In the absence of "exigent
circumstances," warrantless administrative searches are unreasonable
since the burden of obtaining a warrant is not likely to defeat the admin-
istrative purpose behind the search. Once such searches are deemed un-
reasonable, the exclusionary rule should be applied to administrative hear-
ings, since the same policies supporting the rule in the criminal area apply
to administrative proceedings. Finally, states should not be allowed to
precondition bestowal of a state privilege upon waiver of a potential li-
censee's fourth amendment rights. Expanded protection of constitu-
tional rights has already been granted to those who enjoy privileges in
other areas. Increased protections for liquor licensees seem logical and
consistent.
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54. 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840
(1969).
55. Id. at 658, 249 N.E.2d at 445, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
